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Abstract
Pigovian regulation provides monetary penalties/rewards to incentivize prosocial behav-
ior, and may thereby trigger behavioral effects beyond a more standard response associated
with a change in relative prices. This paper quantifies the magnitude of these behavioral ef-
fects using data from an experiment on real product choices together with a structural model
of consumer behavior. First, we show that information about external effects (products’
embodied carbon emissions) triggers voluntary substitution towards cleaner alternatives,
and we estimate that this effect is equivalent to a change in relative prices of GBP30.69-
165.15/tCO2. Second, comparing a Pigovian intervention (GBP19/tCO2) with a neutrally-
framed price change of the same magnitude, we find a negative behavioral effect associated
with regulation. Compensating this bias would require increasing the Pigovian price signal
by up to 48.06/tCO2. Finally, based on a cross-product comparison, we show that the mag-
nitude of behavioral effects declines with substitutability between clean and dirty product
alternatives, a measure of effort to reduce emissions.
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1 Introduction
In a traditional framework, Pigovian regulation sets up a corrective tax/subsidy to make agents
internalize external effects associated with consumption or production decisions (Pigou, 1920).
This classic approach to regulation is, however, increasingly being refined by a literature that
considers how behavioral agents process information and, in turn, how behavioral traits affect
optimal policy design (e.g. Allcott et al., 2014; Farhi and Gabaix, 2015).1 In particular, evi-
dence from economics and experimental psychology suggests that when agents are willing to
voluntarily exert an effort, for example because of (self-)image concerns, explicit financial in-
centives may have a detrimental impact on effort provision (see Gneezy et al., 2011; Bowles and
Polanía-Reyes, 2012, for a review). As Pigovian interventions associate an external monetary
reward/penalty with prosocial behavior, this type of regulation may attenuate the effectiveness
of a change in relative prices (see also Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Bénabou and Tirole,
2003).
While theoretical properties of these mechanisms have been studied extensively (see e.g.
Brekke et al., 2003; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006), empirical evidence as to their relevance for
the design of public policies, and in particular those regulating externalities, remains scant.
Moreover, given the growing use of market-based instruments for environmental policy, the in-
expensive nature of non-price interventions (Bertrand et al., 2010; Allcott, 2011), as well as the
emerging literature on behavioral public finance (e.g. Chetty et al., 2009; Mullainathan et al.,
2012), quantifying the policy implications of behavioral effects associated with Pigovian inter-
ventions is important. This paper provides a first step in that direction. We exploit data from
a field experiment in which subjects make real consumption decisions about ordinary grocery
products, with a set of clean and dirty alternatives as determined by their embodied carbon
emissions.2 After an initial product choice, we randomly assign subjects to three treatments ma-
nipulating attributes of the choice between dirty and clean alternatives: (i) information about
1 A parallel literature focuses on the role of technology and innovation in the transition from processes or products
that generate relatively large external costs (i.e. dirty) to others with relatively low external costs (i.e. clean).
See for example Acemoglu et al. (2012), Aghion et al. (2016) and Acemoglu et al. (2016).
2 One interesting aspect of carbon emissions reduction, as a global public good, is that personal contributions
have negligible direct private benefits (for example in terms of climate), so that choices solely reflect prosocial
motivations. In other cases, contributions may have direct private benefits. For example, information about
energy use of durable products may affect perceptions about both private energy expenditures and external
effects associated with energy use. Thus focusing on climate change allows us to net-out consumption-related
personal benefit from individual choices.
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embodied emissions, revealing the propensity to voluntarily contribute to the emission reduc-
tion effort; (ii) a Pigovian price change, combining a change in relative prices in proportion to
external costs and information about the regulatory nature of the price signal; and (iii) a neu-
trally framed change in relative prices, which mimics market-driven price variations and has the
exact same magnitude as the Pigovian intervention.
Based on a descriptive analysis of the same experimental data, Perino et al. (2014) show
that, as expected, all treatments increase the aggregate choice probability of the clean alterna-
tives (i.e. considering all grocery products together). Perino et al. (2014) further find that the
proportion of respondents who switch from dirty to clean alternatives is smaller for the Pigovian
subsidy than for both the information treatment and the neutral price change. This suggests
that a change in relative prices framed as an explicit external policy intervention induces a
negative behavioral effect, corroborating evidence reviewed in Gneezy et al. (2011). However,
while Perino et al. (2014) focus on differences in aggregate choice frequencies pre- and post-
interventions, in the present paper we exploit the discrete nature of product choices to estimate
a structural demand model for differentiated products.3 In turn, the main novelty of our work
is to use this model to do welfare analysis, and to derive quantitative implications for the design
of public policies.
Another departure from the work of Perino et al. (2014) is that we consider each product cat-
egory included in the experiment separately (with dirty and clean alternatives in brackets here):
cola-type sodas (in aluminum cans and in plastic bottles), spreads (margarine and butter), milk
(skimmed, semi-skimmed and whole), and meat (chicken and beef). This is important because
relative carbon content differs across product categories, and therefore experimental treatments
applied to different products are heterogeneous. Consequently, incentives associated with the
treatments differ across product categories. Moreover, carbon emissions are tied to product
characteristics, so that substitutability between clean and dirty alternatives also varies across
products. Concretely, substituting among cola products in cans or in plastic bottles is not the
same as switching from beef to chicken products in the meat category. Preferences for these
product characteristics are associated with the effort of switching from dirty to clean alterna-
3 Formally, our estimation strategy identifies the structural parameters of the underlying consumer decision prob-
lem using Lancaster’s (1966) multi-attribute utility theory and McFadden’s (1974) random utility model. In this
framework, conditional average treatment effects (CATE) are estimated controlling for preferences over observed
product characteristics, and can be given a welfare-theoretic interpretation.
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tives, and estimated treatment effects can therefore be expected to vary across products.
Our product-level structural estimation strategy allows us to make two key contributions.
First, we exploit the neutrally-framed price change to quantify substitutability of clean and dirty
alternatives across product categories. Based on this, we assess the effectiveness of alterna-
tive interventions as a function of product substitutability. The second and more interesting
contribution afforded by our approach is the ability to estimate money-metric welfare measures
associated with the treatments. Specifically, we estimate an equivalent price metric (EPM, as per
Chetty et al., 2009; Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015) of the information intervention, which mea-
sures the change in relative prices that would yield the same change in choice probabilities as
providing information about carbon emissions. In our setting, the EPM for information provides
an estimate of consumers’ valuation of a reduction of carbon emissions, which can be compared
against estimates of the social cost of carbon (e.g. used to determine the level of the Pigovian
price signal in our experiment). Similarly, we obtain an EPM quantifying the behavioral effects
of the Pigovian intervention aside from the induced change in relative prices. Intuitively, this
EPM quantifies, in monetary terms, the differential impact of a change in relative prices when
it is framed as a Pigovian intervention and when it reflects market-induced variations. As we
detail below, it provides a measure of the increase of Pigovian prices needed to compensate the
negative behavioral effects associated with the regulatory intervention. Our structural approach
thereby provides novel quantitative evidence on the behavioral effect associated with the reg-
ulatory dimension of a Pigovian price change, and what these behavioral traits imply for the
design of policies.
Our key results are as follows.4 First, we find that providing information about the carbon
content induces a voluntary transition towards cleaner products, which signals the existence of
some form of preferences for the public good embedded in the marketed goods (Harsanyi, 1955;
Margolis, 1982; Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992; Nyborg, 2000).5 The EPM estimates associated
4 As noted by Perino et al. (2014), external validity of the results may suffer from the fact that participants know
they participate in an experiment. We note, however, that the experiment reproduces an online shopping envi-
ronment in which respondents completed the choice tasks individually and anonymously through a computer,
mitigating any experimenter demand effects. Moreover, as we discuss below, the changes in choice probabilities
we measure are similar in magnitude to those estimated using actual transactions (e.g. Teisl et al., 2002; Bjorner
et al., 2004).
5 A related literature on altruism and private provision public goods identifies at least three different motivation
for voluntary contributions. First, agents may derive utility from the (shared) private benefits from the public
good (Kotchen, 2005). Second, voluntary provision of public goods can originate from pure altruism (see Becker,
1974; Kotchen, 2006). Third, agents might also derive utility from their own contribution through a warm-glow
effect (Andreoni, 1990).
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with information range from GBP0.03 to GBP1.28 depending on the product category, which
corresponds to GBP30.69-165.15/tCO2. An implication is that consumers’ implicit valuation of
emissions is above most estimates of the social cost of carbon (for reference, we employ a value
of GBP19/tCO2 to compute the Pigovian subsidy, taken from DEFRA, 2002).6
Second, we find evidence of a significant negative behavioral effect associated with Pigovian
regulation. Quantitatively, our EPM estimates amount to GBP48.06/tCO2 for cola products,
GBP37.46/tCO2 for milk, while for spread and meat products EPM estimates are not statistically
significantly different from zero (our point estimates are GBP6.07/tCO2 and GBP0.22/tCO2,
respectively). In the context of global public goods, the literature suggests two behavioral
traits that could explain our findings. The first relies on self-image motivation (Ariely et al.,
2009), which could be negatively affected by the presence of monetary rewards, for example
through ‘moral licensing’ (Schotter et al., 1996; Jacobsen et al., 2012).7 A second mechanism
works through consumers’ prior beliefs about the importance of external effects associated with
their choices. As initially suggested by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a,b), when these beliefs
differ from reality, providing information about the momentary value of behavior through a
tax/subsidy may induce consumers to update their beliefs. In cases where they over-estimate
the impact of external effects associated with their choices, a monetary incentive may lead to
reduced effort or provision.
Third, we exploit the neutrally framed price change to show that substitutability between
clean and dirty alternatives varies substantially across product categories. Further, a cross-
product comparison reveals that policy interventions are more effective for products with high
substitutability across alternatives. This finding is intuitive, and it is already recognized in the
literature (e.g. Bjorner et al., 2004). However, the ability to assess, in a controlled environ-
ment, how substitutability affects the behavioral impact of price and non-price interventions is
novel. We also observe that the extent of behavioral effects associated with Pigovian regulation
varies with substitutability: for products with close substitutes (cola and milk in our setting)
we observe very substantial negative behavioral effects, while for products where substitution
6 There is a lot of uncertainty regarding the value of external costs associated with carbon emissions, and DEFRA
(2002) was the relevant source at the time the experiment was designed. More recent estimates used by the
UK government for the appraisal of public projects in 2016 tend to be slightly lower, with a central value of
5.94/tCO2 and an upper bound of 23.40/tCO2 (see DECC, 2013).
7 Moral licensing theory rationalizes findings from psychology of how individuals self-justify “bad” behavior by
performing “good” actions. See Monin and Miller (2001) for example.
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requires more effort (spreads and meat) behavioral effects are small and statistically indistin-
guishable from zero. Intuitively, if prosocial behavior requires more effort, self-image benefits
will have relatively less weight in the decision to switch towards cleaner alternatives. Therefore,
we can conjecture that when self-image concerns are given relatively less weight in consumption
decisions, the detrimental impact of external monetary interventions declines.
Aside from quantifying the extent of behavioral effects associated with Pigovian regulation,
our results also contribute to the growing empirical literature on how information about external
effects affect consumption decisions. In particular, several studies have shown that voluntary
public good provision can be triggered by information, and that this can have a significant
effect on market outcomes. For example, Teisl et al. (2002) use data from the U.S. to show
that information labels led to an increase in the market share of “Dolphin-friendly” canned
tuna. Similarly, Bjorner et al. (2004) use a large sample of Danish consumer from 1997 to
2001 to identify a positive marginal willingness to pay for the label “Nordic Swan.” These
studies have established the role of information provision using day-to-day transactions, and
our work provides an interesting complement in which the choice set and substitution patterns
are controlled experimentally. Importantly, the magnitude of our findings for the information
treatment, with changes in choice probabilities ranging from 10 to 30 percent, is similar to
the studies using market share observations, suggesting that our results are reflective of (non-
experimental) market behavior.
Our work is also related to a number of recent papers studying the behavioral effect of tax-
related prices changes, as compared to less salient variation in market prices (e.g. the seminal
paper by Chetty et al., 2009; on the demand for gasoline products, see Davis and Kilian, 2011,
Li et al., 2014, and Rivers and Schaufele, 2015). One particularly relevant paper is Rivers and
Schaufele (2015), who estimate that the impact of a carbon tax targeting explicitly a reduc-
tion of gasoline demand is about four times larger than the effect induced by price fluctuations
unrelated to environmental policy. While at first sight this evidence may seem to contradict
our results, a key difference compared to our analysis is the role of salience. In observational
data, market-driven changes in prices are less salient as compared to policy-driven interven-
tions, which would tend to exacerbate the impact of the latter. By contrast, in our experiment,
salience of Pigovian and neutrally-framed price changes is held constant. Therefore, relative to
Rivers and Schaufele (2015), our contribution is to quantify the effect of information included
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in Pigovian prices, controlling for the magnitude of the change in relative prices as well as its
salience.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the experimen-
tal setting, including the four different consumption goods we consider and the three treatment
interventions. In Section 3, we present our empirical strategy, including identification of the
EPM for information and the behavioral effect of Pigovian regulation. Section 4 presents our
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
Data on consumer choices are collected in seven supermarkets in the greater London area.8 Con-
sumers entering the supermarket are offered to participate in a “university-sponsored grocery
shopping study” with a GBP5 voucher compensation. The experiment is described as neutrally
as possible, “studying how people make REAL LIFE grocery shopping decisions.” No other in-
formation on the purpose of the experiment is provided to avoid self-selection of respondents
with a specific interest in environmental issues. Participants in the experiment are selected by
identifying those who intended to purchase a product in one out of four categories: cola-type
sodas, milk, spreads (margarine and butter) and meat (chicken and beef).9
The experiment consists of two steps. First, recruited subjects have to complete an initial
product choice for the product categories in which they intended to make a purchase during
their shopping trip. The product choice set, which is a key building block of our identification
strategy, is discussed in details below. This part of the experiment takes place at the entrance
of the supermarket, using a laptop, and closely replicates an online shopping environment. To
make the choice environment as realistic as possible, the presentation of products is very close
to the actual online shopping platform of the store, and product prices match those in the store
on the day of the experiment.
8 Perino et al. (2014) provides information about the sampling of the locations and how the experiment was setup
within each supermarket. Here we focus on the aspects of the experiment that are most relevant for our structural
identification strategy.
9 Potential participants are turned down if younger than 21 years old, if they cannot speak or read English, or
if they had participated in the experiment previously. While the selection mechanism means that our sample
is non-random, as we essentially focus on sub-populations purchasing the products we selected, it includes the
relevant population of customers purchasing the products of interest in this geographical area. Note that we
do not, however, observe the characteristics for this population, and it is not necessarily representative of the
population in other locations. Nevertheless Appendix A shows that our sample includes a diverse socio-economic
background.
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Following their initial product choice, participants are offered the option to receive general
information about either nutritional matters, carbon emissions and climate change, or both.10
Subjects are then randomly assigned to one out of three treatments (described in more details in
the subsections below): (i) an information label showing embodied carbon emissions associated
with clean vs. dirty alternatives; (ii) a Pigovian subsidy on the clean alternatives; and (iii) a
neutrally framed price reduction of the clean alternatives of the same magnitude as the Pigovian
subsidy. After treatment, subjects are allowed to revise their initial choice. In the final part of
the computerized step, socio-demographic data are collected.
In the second step of the experiment, subjects complete their planned grocery trip in the
main shopping area of the supermarket, before coming back to the entry of the store to col-
lect a GBP5 voucher. This part allows us to enforce truthful preference revelation by making
payment of the voucher conditional on the purchase of the good selected in the post-treatment
consumption choice (subjects are informed about this condition beforehand).11 The compliance
rate is 96 percent, and non-compliers are dropped from the sample.12 This yields a total of 854
shoppers who completed the task independently, complied with all terms and conditions of the
experiment, and are thus included in the sample. Table B1 in Appendix B summarizes random-
ized treatment assignment, illustrating that subsamples are balanced on observables (t-tests of
difference in means are insignificant for all but one variable, gender).
In the following, we further discuss the product choice set, and then describe each treatment
intervention.
2.1 Product alternatives
Each product category includes a fixed and finite number of alternatives, reported in Table 1,
which we classify as ‘clean’ or ‘dirty’ according to relative embodied carbon emissions (measured
10 We note that this feature of the experiment can potentially introduce heterogeneity in the treatment effect. It
is therefore important to emphasize that the information is presented in a neutral manner, and does not relate
in any way to the products on offer. In our empirical analysis, we have nevertheless checked for systematic
differences across respondents who obtained further information and those who did not, finding little evidence
of a significant (both economic and statistical) impact on the results. This is, in fact, in line with findings
discussed in Perino et al. (2014).
11 For the subsidy and neutral price change treatments, participants who selected the option with an experimentally
altered price also received the difference between the experimental price (reduced by the subsidy) and the in-
store price.
12 We acknowledge that dropping these observation may introduce some systematic selection, although given the
high compliance rate this is unlikely to affect our results significantly.
7
Table 1: Product categories and clean / dirty alternatives
Products Clean alternatives Dirty alternatives
Options Price Emissions Options Price Emissions
(GBP) (kgCO2) (GBP) (kgCO2)
Cola Coca Cola in PET bottle (2l) 1.69 0.50 Coca Cola in ALU cans (2l) 2.85 1.02
Coca Cola Diet in PET bottle (2l) 1.69 0.50 Coca Cola Diet in ALU cans (2l) 2.85 1.02
Coca Cola Zero in PET bottle (2l) 1.69 0.50 Coca Cola Zero in ALU cans (2l) 2.85 1.02
Pepsi Regular in PET bottle (2l) 1.00-1.69 0.50 Pepsi Regular in ALU cans (2l) 2.75 1.02
Pepsi Diet in PET bottle (2l) 1.00-1.69 0.50 Pepsi Diet in ALU cans (2l) 2.75 1.02
Pepsi Max in PET bottle (2l) 1.00-1.69 0.50 Pepsi Max in ALU cans (2l) 2.75 1.02
Milk Skimmed milk (2 pints) 0.86 1.40 Whole milk (2 pints) 0.86 1.80
Semiskimmed milk (2 pints) 0.86 1.60
Spread Lurpak Spread (500g) 2.58 0.68 Lurpak butter (500g) 2.76 11.90
Sainsbury’s spread (500g) 1.00 0.68 Sainsbury’s Basics butter (500g) 1.76 11.90
Anchor Spreadable (500g) 2.18 0.68 Anchor butter (500g) 2.40 11.90
Flora Original spread (500g) 1.18 0.68 Country life butter (500g) 2.36 11.90
Clover (500g) 1.49 0.68 Kerrygold butter (500g) 1.90 11.90
Meat Chicken breast (300g) 2.39 1.50 Beef braising steak (440g) 3.49 7.04
Chicken fillet (500g) 2.18 - 4.00 2.50 Beef mince (500g) 2.20 8.00
Chicken thighs & drumsticks (721g) 2.37 - 3.00 3.61 Diced casserole steak (440g) 2.50 7.04
Notes: Table displays the exhaustive list of options available to consumers in each product category. For some alternatives in the cola and meat
product categories the supermarket modified its price over the course of the experiment, and for consistency it was reflected in the experiment.
in CO2 equivalent). Carbon emissions are associated with a particular feature of the product
category. For cola products low-emissions alternatives are sold in a 2L PET bottle, whereas
the high emissions alternatives are sold in aluminum cans. For milk, carbon emissions are
proportional to the fat content, for spreads the carbon content is higher for butter relative to
margarine (produced mainly from vegetable oil), and for meat it is higher for beef products.
Preferences over product characteristics related to emissions (such as plastic vs. aluminum
packaging or the type of meat) are a key determinant of substitutability, and therefore capture
the effort associated with switching from dirty to clean alternatives. Thus for example, if the
type of meat matters to consumers, they will be more resistant to substitute away from the beef
alternatives.
2.2 Emissions information treatment
The information treatment consists in a carbon “footprint” label in the form of a stylized footprint
and shows the amount of CO2 (in grams) emitted over the product’s production process (i.e.
embodied emissions). As shown in Table 1, the difference in carbon emissions between clean
and dirty alternatives varies significantly across product categories.
In order to avoid overemphasizing the importance of the information on emissions, which
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would allow respondent to easily guess the theme of the experiment, we also provided nutri-
tional information. Because this information is readily provided on product packages, consumers
who have preferences for these characteristics of the products would already be aware of them
and hence it should not overly influence choices.13
2.3 Pigovian subsidy to the clean alternative
The Pigovian subsidy treatment decreases the price of the clean alternatives in proportion to
embodied carbon emissions. For example, in the case of cola products, respondents are told
that “There has been a price change. Products in plastic bottles have a 5p discount due to
a GOVERNMENT SUBSIDY received on account of its low carbon footprint.” This provides
information about differences in relative emissions between alternatives, and makes clear that
the change in price is associated with an external government intervention as a way to reduce
carbon emissions associated with consumption.
The value of the Pigovian subsidy is determined by the externality created by the consump-
tion of different alternatives. More specifically, starting from an estimate for the social cost of
carbon of GBP19/tCO2 taken from DEFRA (2002), the subsidy is calculated by using the differ-
ence in embodied CO2 emissions between clean and dirty alternatives. The final values of the
subsidies are: GBP0.05 for cola products in PET bottles; GBP0.03 for semi-skimmed milk, or
GBP0.06 for skimmed milk; GBP0.43 for margarine; and GBP0.21 per kg of chicken.
2.4 Neutrally framed price reduction of the clean alternatives
The change in price in this treatment is equivalent to the subsidy, but the justification is framed
in a neutral manner. For example the neutral price change for cola products is presented as
follows: “There has been a price change. Products in plastic bottles have a 5p discount because
of a change in the price of materials.” The change in relative prices is thus caused by market
conditions unrelated to the regulation of externalities.
This treatment allows us to quantify how an exogenous price change induces consumers to
substitute towards the clean alternative without reference to an external intervention targeting
a reduction of carbon emissions. Moreover, this treatment has several advantages. First, it yields
13 Note that it could potentially be the case that consumers factor in carbon emissions in their initial choices. In our
analysis, this would be captured by preferences for product characteristics in each product category as estimated
from the baseline product choice.
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an internally consistent estimate of price responsiveness, capturing the willingness (or effort)
to substitute between clean and dirty alternatives. Second, this allows calculating monetary
equivalents for differences in effectiveness across interventions. Finally, as we show below, it can
be used to identify the magnitude of the behavioral effect associated with Pigovian regulation
aside from the change in relative prices.
3 Estimation Strategy
In each of the two sequential choice occasions, consumers select one product from a finite set of
alternatives, and a natural estimation framework is McFadden’s (1974) model for differentiated
products. Specifically, in the initial choice, consumers reveal their preferences for the attributes
of each product by selecting their preferred alternative in the absence of any interventions. In
the second choice, product characteristics are manipulated by the treatments, altering the public
good attributes (information and Pigovian subsidy treatments) and relative prices (Pigovian
subsidy and neutral price change treatments). By using a structural representation of the choice
process we are able to quantify the CATE controlling for preferences over observed product
characteristics, and derive money-metric welfare measures associated with the treatments.
In the following we first describe the conceptual framework and proceed by describing our
maximum likelihood estimation procedure. Finally we explain how we quantify the EPM for
information and for the behavioral effect of Pigovian regulation.
3.1 Conceptual framework
Denote the utility that consumer n derives from alternative j by U jn, the price of j by pj and the
utility of all observed and unobserved (non-price) characteristics of that alternative by ujn, so
that: U jn = u
j
n−pj . Further denote relative utility of dirty and clean options as un = udirtyn −ucleann
and relative prices as p = pdirty − pclean. Consumer n will select a dirty alternative if:
Udirtyn > U
clean
n ⇔ un > p . (1)
After observing an initial choice, experimental treatments manipulate both the relative utility
from consuming each good and the relative prices.
When clean and dirty alternatives are good substitutes, a small change in relative prices
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will dominate the difference in utility derived from consuming the two goods. Identification
of substitutability is achieved by the neutrally framed price treatment in the form of a price
elasticity. Let βpricen denote the change in relative utility induced by neutral price change Δp.
The neutral price change will induce consumer n to switch to the clean alternative if:
βpricen Δp > un − p . (2)
In words, the utility weight associated with a reduced price for the clean alternative has to
outweigh the surplus derived from consuming the dirty instead of the clean alternative. In turn,
price responsiveness of consumers provides a measure of how close or substitutable the two
alternatives are.
Turning to the information treatment, denote embodied CO2 emissions of alternative j by ej .
Providing information reveals individuals’ preferences for the public good component of each
product, denoted by βinfon . Thus under the information treatment a consumer will switch to the
clean alternative when:
βinfon Δe > un − p , (3)
whereΔe = edirty−eclean. When clean and dirty alternatives are perceived to be good substitutes,
the right hand side will be relatively small, and information about the extent of external effects
may significantly increase the probability of choosing one of the clean alternatives.
The final treatment is the Pigovian subsidy. This treatment changes relative prices in the
same way as the neutral price change does, but it also frames the monetary change as a reg-
ulatory intervention targeting relative carbon emissions. We can thus write that a consumer
initially choosing the dirty alternative will switch to one of the clean alternatives provided that:
βpigoun Δs = β
price
n Δp+ β
regul
n > un − p , (4)
where Δs is the subsidy amount, Δp is the monetary price signal defined above, and βreguln
measures the behavioral impact of the Pigovian regulatory intervention over and above the
impact of the change in relative prices. In particular, βreguln captures the effect of framing the
price change as an explicit government intervention related to the external effects associated
with each product.
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3.2 Structural estimation: Multinomial choice
For each category of product, there is a finite number of alternatives J from which the consumers
can choose from (see Table 1), and each alternative is described by a set of characteristics
or attributes. These are summarized in Table 2. For instance, in the case of cola products,
characteristics are packaging (2L PET bottle or aluminum cans), price (in cent), brand (Coca-
Cola or Pepsi), and ‘Light’ or ‘Zero/Max’ versions.14 For cola, spread and meat product categories
the first attribute (attribute 1) is an indicator variable equal to one if a particular product is one
of the dirty alternatives, zero otherwise. In the case of milk products there are 3 different
alternatives that vary only in terms of the amount of fat (in grams), and is perfectly collinear
with embodied carbon emissions. Thus preferences for clean and dirty versions of milk products
are given by preferences for the fat content.
Assuming that individual n chooses alternative j if the utility of j is greater than any other
alternatives i in the choice set, the probability that option j is selected by individual n is:
P jn = Prob(U
j
n > U
i
n) , ∀i = j . (5)
Following McFadden (1974), we decompose the utility of product j into a deterministic part
observed by the researcher, denoted by V jn , and an unobserved part denoted ε
j
n, so that: U
j
n =
V jn + ε
j
n. Given the notation developed above, we specify the observed part of utility as:
V jn = γ
′
nZ
j + Icleaninfo · βinfon Δe+ Icleanpigou · βpigoun Δs+ Icleanprice · βpricen Δp (6)
where Zj is a vector of observed product attributes as defined in Table 2, Icleaninfo , I
clean
pigou and I
clean
price
are indicator variables equal to one if a particular choice is done under a given treatment and
option j is one of the clean alternatives, and γ, β are parameters to be estimated from the data.
The unobserved part of the utility εjn is assumed to be identically and independently dis-
tributed according to an extreme value type 1 distribution, so that choice probabilities take the
14 These attributes represent an exhaustive list of observed dimensions across which product alternatives differ.
Preferences for attributes that do not vary across alternatives, such as for example the country of origin, are not
identified. Obviously, there can be other factors that influence choices, and as we show below the importance of
unobservable characteristics will be reflected in the size of the structural error term.
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Table 2: Choice set, product attributes and policy treatments
Cola Milk Spread Meat
Nr. of alternativesa 12 3 10 6
Product attributes
Attribute 1b ALU cans (=1) Fat cont. (g) Butter (=1) Beef (=1)
Attribute 2 Price (GBP cent) – Price (GBP cent) Price (GBP cent)
Attribute 3 Coca-Cola brand (=1) – Lurpak brand (=1) Protein (g)
Attribute 4 Light (=1) – Sainsbury brand (=1) Salt (g)
Attribute 5 Zero/Max (=1) – Anchor brand (=1) Fat (g)
Attribute 6 – – Proteins (g) Weight (g)
Attribute 7 – – Fat (g) –
Attribute 8 – – Salt (g) –
Policy treatments
Information label Difference in embodied carbon emissions between clean and dirty alternatives (kgCO2)
Pigovian subsidy Pigovian subsidy to the price of the clean options (GBP cent)
Neutral price change Neutrally framed decrease in price of clean options (GBP cent)
Notes: Table lays out the data structure underlying estimation of a discrete choice demand model. aEach product category includes the
number of product alternatives reported in Table 1. bAttribute 1 determines whether a product alternative belongs to the set of dirty
alternatives, and thus captures preferences for the dirty version of each product. For milk, in which the semi-skimmed alternative has a
carbon footprint in between that of whole milk and skimmed milk alternatives, we use a continuous measure for the fat content.
convenient logit form:
P jn = Prob(V
j
n − V in > εjn − εin) =
eV
j
n
eV
j
n +
∑
i e
V in
, ∀i = j (7)
and the log-likelihood function writes:
logL =
N∑
n=1
J∑
j=1
∑
t=1,2
djnt logP
j
nt (8)
where djnt is an indicator function equal to 1 if alternative j is selected in choice t, zero other-
wise. When preference parameters are the same for each individuals, the model reduces to the
standard multinomial logit (MNL) framework, which makes maximum likelihood estimation of
the structural parameters straightforward. However, the MNL model implies restrictive substi-
tution patterns, the so-called independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. To exploit
the panel structure of the data and allow the error term to be correlated across alternatives, and
thereby relax the IIA requirement, we account for unobserved preference heterogeneity using a
random parameter or mixed logit (MXL) specification (Revelt and Train, 1998; McFadden and
Train, 2000). The MXL model is estimated via simulated maximum likelihood, where unob-
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served preference parameters are assumed to be normally distributed in the population, and we
approximate the integral of the unconditional probability of each panel choice using 200 Halton
draws.15
In a discrete choice demand model a change in one of the attributes affects the choice prob-
abilities (or market shares) of all options, so that the vector of estimated parameters is not
directly tied to marginal effects on choice probabilities. In addition, because the estimated co-
efficients are not separately identified from the variance of the error term (or scale parameter),
coefficients cannot be directly compared across estimated models. Thus in order to compare
results across product categories we use the estimated structural model to simulate the impact
of the treatments on the choice probability of clean alternatives.16
3.3 Equivalent price metric for policy interventions
One benefit of estimating a structural utility-maximization model is the ability to conduct wel-
fare analysis, and more broadly to inform policy design. Here we build on the work of Chetty
et al. (2009) who compare a tax-demand curve and a price-demand curve, and Allcott and
Taubinsky (2015) who similarly define the EPM as follows:
EPMtreatment =
Dtreatment(p)−D(p)
D′(p)
(9)
where Dtreatment(p) − D(p) is the change in demand of the clean alternative induced by the
treatment, and D′(p) is the price responsiveness of demand. In our experiment, the neutral
price change treatment provides a relevant measure of D′(p), as it directly manipulates relative
prices of clean and dirty alternatives.17
Given the notation developed above, the EPM of information is equal to the ratio between
15 Note that the taste normality assumption mainly serves tractability of the simulation process and that the pref-
erence parameters measuring treatment effects are held fixed. We also considered specifications with random
coefficients for the treatment effects but encountered numerical convergence issues likely caused by the fact that
we only observe one choice per respondent in the presence of a treatment.
16 For MXL models choice probabilities have no closed-form expressions, and we rely on a bootstrap procedure
to obtain standard errors. As simulation-based estimation for MXL specifications is computationally intensive,
we rely on 1000 replications. Although this number is relatively small, the ensuing inference yields similar
conclusions to the closed-form results drawn from MNL specifications, which suggests that this is appropriate.
17 Note that the structural model effectively provides a framework to extrapolate the treatment effect in an inter-
nally consistent manner. This is a valid approach as long as the model of behavior is appropriate and the social
value of carbon (and hence the Pigovian price) is fixed. As we discuss further in the concluding section, if there is
uncertainty in the correct Pigovian price, our research design could be extended to estimate the average marginal
bias along the demand curve (Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015).
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Table 3: Definition of equivalent price metric (EPM) statistics
Statistic Definition Units
EPMinfo Δeβ
info
βprice
EPM for the information label GBP cent
βinfo
βprice
EPM for the information label per unit of emissions GBP per tCO2
EPMregul β
regul
βprice
EPM for the behavioral effect of Pigovian regulation GBP cent
βregul
βprice
1
Δe EPM for the behavioral effect of Pigovian regulation per unit of emissions GBP per tCO2
the utility weight associated with the information treatment and that of the neutral price change
treatment:
EPMinfo =
βinfo
βprice
. (10)
Intuitively, EPMinfo measures the change in relative prices that would generate a behavioral
change of the same magnitude as that of the information treatment, capturing consumers’ valu-
ation of relative carbon emissions embodied in the products.
Similarly, our framework can be used to quantify the behavioral effect associated with Pigo-
vian regulation, and given the notation developed above the associated EPM is given by:
EPMregul =
βregul
βprice
=
βpigouΔs− βpriceΔp
βprice
. (11)
In words, EPMregul reflects the behavioral effect (in monetary terms) of information provided
by a Pigovian intervention netting out the change in relative prices. If an explicit external
intervention attenuates incentives to behave prosocially (switching to a low-emission alternative
in the present case), this welfare measure quantifies the change in relative prices that would
compensate the negative behavioral effects. For example, as initially put forward by Gneezy
and Rustichini (2000b) in a different context, if consumers’ valuation of emissions reduction is
higher than the Pigovian price signal, a Pigovian intervention may crowd out intrinsic motivation
to switch towards a cleaner alternative. The Pigovian price would therefore need to be set higher
in order to compensate this behavioral trait (Allcott et al., 2014; Farhi and Gabaix, 2015).
Table 3 summarizes the statistics used to quantify the monetary equivalent of the information
treatment and the behavioral effect associated with Pigovian regulation. Note that these quan-
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tities are free of the scale parameter and are thus directly comparable across models. Moreover,
to compare EPM estimates across product categories, we control for the fact that products differ
with respect to the level of embodied emissions (Δe) and estimate EPM per unit of emissions.
4 Data and Results
4.1 Descriptive statistics: Choice frequencies before and after treatments
Table 4 shows choice frequencies for the clean alternatives across product categories, before
and after each treatment. The pre-treatment shares of clean alternatives range from around 10
percent on average for milk products to 50 percent on average for spreads, with some differences
across treatments (a feature of randomized treatment assignment). Taking these differences
into account is important to appropriately identify treatment effects. As discussed above, a key
feature of our estimation strategy is that it allows us to control for these differences by estimating
preference parameters for observed product characteristics as revealed by pre-treatment choices.
Descriptive statistics further show that all the treatments induced significant increases in
the choice probability of clean alternatives. There is, however, ample variation both across
treatments and across product categories. Comparing the impact of treatments within product
categories, the proportion of consumers who switched towards clean alternatives is somewhat
larger with an information label as compared to a Pigovian subsidy. Moreover, the neutrally
framed price change also has a larger impact as compared to the Pigovian subsidy, suggesting
that the regulatory intervention has a negative behavioral effect. These observations and their
statistical significance (in terms of changes in choice frequencies) are discussed in details by
Perino et al. (2014), although they aggregate all product categories together.
Comparing the impact of treatments across product categories, the largest percentage change
is generally observed for cola products (substitution towards products in plastic packaging).
However both the size of the treatment and the initial choice frequency differs, rendering com-
parisons difficult.
4.2 Econometric results
We now turn to the estimation results for the structural model which provides evidence on: (i)
the CATE for each product controlling for preferences over product characteristics and embodied
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Table 4: Observed choice frequencies of clean alternatives by product category (percentage)
Information Pigovian Neutral price
label subsidy change
Cola Before treatment 47.6 31.3 27.0
After treatment 66.7 50.0 69.8
Difference 19.1 18.7 42.8
Milk Before treatment 12.3 6.1 8.3
After treatment 19.3 10.9 14.3
Difference 7.0 4.8 6.0
Spread Before treatment 55.2 56.3 39.0
After treatment 82.8 63.4 51.2
Difference 27.6 7.1 12.2
Meat Before treatment 12.5 20.6 21.7
After treatment 32.1 30.2 33.3
Difference 19.6 9.6 11.6
Notes: This table reports the percentage of respondents who selected one of the clean alternative before and after
each treatments.
carbon emissions; (ii) substitutability across clean and dirty alternatives; (iii) an EPM for the
information treatment and behavioral bias associated with the Pigovian intervention.
Estimation results from MNL and MXL models are reported in Table 5. Recall that coefficients
on attribute 1 provide evidence about preferences for the dirty alternatives. Except for spread
products, these estimates have a positive sign and are highly statistically significant, which is
consistent with the relatively large initial choice frequency for dirty alternatives reported in Table
4. Other variables capturing preferences for product attributes are mostly statistically significant
at conventional levels, suggesting that the structural model provides a good account of observed
choices. This is confirmed by comparing simulated choice probabilities of clean alternatives
with the actual choice frequencies observed in our sample (Figure 1). The MXL specification
further suggests the presence of preference heterogeneity, as demonstrated by the statistically
significant standard deviation estimates. The goodness-of-fit statistics generally favor the MXL
models and, since it provides a more flexible representation of behavior, in the rest of the paper
we consider only results from MXL specifications.
The main estimates of interest are those associated with the three treatments, as they quan-
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Figure 1: Initial market shares of clean alternatives across products(%)
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Notes: Figure 1 plots the observed market share of clean alternatives before the treatments against that
predicted by MNL and MXL models reported in Table 5.
tify the impact of each treatment on choice probabilities.18 We find that the estimated utility
weights associated with the information label, Pigovian subsidy and neutral price change all
have the expected sign, having a positive impact on the choice probability of the clean alter-
natives. Moreover, the treatments variables in MXL models are all statistically significant at
conventional levels.
As mentioned previously, estimation results cannot be directly compared across product cate-
gories, and in the following we study the impact of treatments on simulated choice probabilities
(or market shares). We start with substitutability between clean and dirty and alternatives, and
then quantify the effectiveness of policy instruments. Finally we report estimates of the EPM
for the information treatment and quantifying the behavioral effect associated with the Pigovian
intervention.
4.2.1 Measures of substitutability for each product category
Evidence about substitutability between clean and dirty alternatives is based on the responsive-
ness to a neutral price change. In Table 6 we report changes in simulated choice probabilities
for the clean alternatives associated with the neutral price change treatment, derived from MXL
model. The impact of the neutral price change specified in the experiment (i.e. the CATE) refers
18 As Table 1 reports, the information treatment is coded as the difference (in kg of CO2) between the clean and
dirty alternatives (for milk product we take whole milk as the baseline). The neutrally framed price change and
the Pigovian subsidy are coded in GBP cent.
19
Table 6: Substitutability between clean and dirty alternatives
Cola Milk Spread Meat
Neutral price change: CATE 42.10∗∗∗ 11.27∗∗∗ 11.07∗∗∗ 8.52∗∗∗
(2.52) (0.61) (3.04) (3.43)
10% neutral price change 70.06∗∗∗ 14.96∗∗∗ 4.46∗∗∗ 10.92∗∗∗
(4.13) (0.63) (1.23) (4.52)
Neutral price change (GBP cent) 9.02∗∗∗ 1.84∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.75) (0.13) (0.09) (0.16)
Respondents 148 372 182 152
Notes: This table displays the marginal impact of the neutrally framed price change on simulated choice
probabilities (or market shares) of clean alternatives, reported in percentage points difference. We report
changes in simulated choice probabilities corresponding to the conditional average treatment effect (CATE),
a 10% price reduction, and a 1 GBP cent price reduction. Simulated choice probabilities are derived from
the MXL specifications reported in Table 5. Bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the respondent level
reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
to different price changes for each product. To make comparison across products possible, we
employ the estimated model to simulated changes in probabilities for a normalized treatment
effect. More specifically, we consider the effect of a relative (10%) and absolute (1 GBP cent)
neutrally framed price change.
Results indicate that the CATE is positive and highly statistically significant for all the prod-
ucts, with a 42 percent increase in the choice probability of cola products in plastic bottles, and
around 10 percent for milk, spread and meat product categories. These figures are close to the
descriptive statistics reported in Table 4, which again suggests that the model fits the data well.
Comparing results across products based on normalized treatment sizes, results show that
changes in simulated choice probabilities is highest for cola products, followed by milk, meat and
spread products. The ranking of products in terms of substitutability between clean and dirty
alternatives is similar for absolute and proportional treatment sizes, and it is also confirmed if we
consider the change in choice probabilities for clean products relative to a situation without the
treatment. Specifically, for a unit change in relative prices, the choice probability of clean cola
products increases from around 32% to 41%, or a 35% increase. The corresponding increase is
17% for milk, 1.2% for meat and 0.5% for spread.
20
4.2.2 Policy instruments: Comparison across products categories
Having established that substitutability between clean and dirty alternatives is highest for cola
products, followed by milk, meat and spread products, we now study the impact of information
and Pigovian treatments. Results derived from the MXL models are reported in Table 7. Panel A
shows the CATE measured by the change in choice probabilities of clean alternatives. Because
embodied carbon emissions of clean and dirty alternatives differ across product categories, these
results can only be compared within products. To compare treatments across products, Panel B
reports simulated changes in clean choice probabilities for normalized treatment sizes. For the
information treatment, we consider a proportional 10% difference in emissions from clean and
dirty alternatives as well as a unit difference measured in kg of CO2. Similarly, for the Pigovian
subsidy we consider both a 10% and a one GBP cent subsidy.
We find that the CATE is economically and statistically significant, ranging from 12 to 28 per-
cent for the information label, and from 5.5 to 22 percent for the Pigovian subsidy. Comparing
the impact of the treatments within products, the CATE of information is larger than that of the
Pigovian subsidy for all product categories. This result is in line with aggregate results reported
in Perino et al. (2014), and is also reasonably close to observational studies such as Teisl et al.
(2002) and Bjorner et al. (2004).
Turning to evidence from normalized treatment effects, we find important differences across
products. In particular, there is clear evidence that the effectiveness of policy interventions is
related to substitutability between clean and dirty alternatives. For the information treatment,
the choice probability of clean alternatives is most responsive for cola and milk products, while
spread and meat are significantly less sensitive. Results for the Pigovian treatment similarly
shows that cola products are very responsive to the intervention, whereas meat and in particular
spread products are not. The ranking of products is again similar for absolute and proportional
treatment sizes.
While these results accord with expectations, they should be contrasted with those reported
in Panel A (and in Table 4), which suggest sizable impacts of the information and Pigovian
subsidy treatments on both spread and meat products, and a small impact for milk products.
Controlling for the initial market share of the dirty products (and underlying preferences for
observed product characteristics) and for variation in embodied carbon across products (and
associated size of the treatment effect) thus highlights the role of substitutability between clean
21
Table 7: Effectiveness of policy instruments within and across products
Cola Milk Spread Meat
Panel A: Within product comparison
Information label: CATE 27.00∗∗∗ 12.23∗∗∗ 29.45∗∗∗ 13.78∗
(1.52) (1.03) (9.17) (6.99)
Pigovian subsidy: CATE 21.82∗∗∗ 8.63∗∗∗ 8.47∗∗∗ 8.59∗∗∗
(1.24) (0.72) (2.48) (2.89)
Panel B: Across product comparison
10% information label 5.43∗∗∗ 5.68∗∗∗ 3.19∗∗ 1.52∗
(0.74) (0.63) (1.34) (0.82)
Information label (kgCO2) 48.23∗∗∗ 19.70∗∗∗ 2.69∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(2.04) (0.54) (0.89) (0.34)
10% Pigovian subsidy 59.96∗∗∗ 12.01∗∗∗ 3.47∗∗∗ 10.47∗∗∗
(1.90) (0.82) (0.87) (2.34)
Pigovian subsidy (GBP cent) 4.46∗∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.13) (0.04) (0.03)
Respondents 148 372 182 152
Notes: Panel A displays the marginal impact of the information treatment and Pigovian subsidy on simu-
lated choice probabilities (or market shares) of clean alternatives, reported in percentage points differences.
We report changes in simulated choice probabilities corresponding to the conditional average treatment ef-
fect (CATE). Panel B displays the same but for a normalized treatment size representing a 10% difference
(in relative emissions or relative prices) or a unit difference (in kgCO2 and GBP cent for the information
label and Pigovian subsidy respectively). Simulated choice probabilities are derived from the MXL specifi-
cations reported in Table 5. Bootstrapped standard errors reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: statistically
significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
and dirty alternatives.
4.2.3 EPM for information and the behavioral effect of Pigovian regulation
This section concludes the comparison of regulatory interventions by reporting EPM estimates
for information and the behavioral effect of Pigovian regulation, using the statistics laid out
in Table 3. Results derived from MXL models are reported in Table 8. Panel A reports EPM
estimates for the information treatment both for the specified size of the treatment effect (i.e.
the EPM of the CATE measured in GBP cent) and per unit of emission (measured in GBP per
tCO2). The latter estimates provide a basis for a comparison of results across products. Panel B
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Table 8: EPM for information and the behavioral effect of Pigovian regulation
Cola Milk Spread Meat
Panel A: Equivalent price metric for information (EPMinfo)
Δeβinfo/βprice (GBP cent) 3.07∗∗ 6.61∗∗∗ 128.25∗∗ 33.76∗∗∗
(1.47) (1.12) (53.8) (3.19)
βinfo/βprice (GBP per tCO2) 59.08∗∗ 165.15∗∗∗ 114.26∗∗ 30.69∗∗∗
(28.35) (28.07) (47.93) (11.19)
Panel B: Equivalent price metric for behavioral impact of Pigovian regulation (EPMregul)
βregul/βprice (GBP cent) -2.50∗∗∗ -1.50∗∗ -6.82 -0.25
(0.68) (0.72) (15.77) (1.93)
βregul/βprice 1Δe (GBP per tCO2) -48.06
∗∗∗ -37.46∗∗ -6.07 -0.22
(13.14) (17.92) (14.05) (1.76)
Respondents 148 372 182 152
Notes: Panel A displays the equivalent price metric (EPM) for the information label measured in GBP cent
(i.e. the EPM of the CATE) and in GBP per tCO2 (allowing a comparison across product categories). Panel
B displays the EPM for the behavioral effect of Pigovian regulation measured in GBP cent (referring to the
CATE) and in GBP per tCO2 (allowing a comparison across product categories). See Table 3 for a definition
of the EPM statistics. All estimates are derived from the MXL specifications reported in Table 5. Standard
errors clustered at the respondent level obtained via the delta methods reported in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗:
statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
reports the EPM associated with the behavioral effect of Pigovian regulation, both for the CATE
and per unit of emissions.
For the information treatment, the EPM of the CATE ranges from GBP0.03 for cola products
to GBP1.28 for spread products, and all estimates are statistically significantly different from
zero at conventional levels. Recall that for both cola and spread products the CATE of infor-
mation is relatively large (Table 7, Panel A), but the neutrally framed price change has a much
larger impact on choice probabilities for cola products relative to spread products (Table 6).
However, once we control for variation in products’ embodied emissions, EPM estimates are
more similar across product categories, ranging from around GBP31/tCO2 for meat products
to around GBP165/tCO2 for milk. Because βinfo/βprice can be interpreted as a marginal rate of
substitution between embodied carbon emissions and money, it also provides an estimate for
consumers’ monetary valuation of embodied carbon emissions. For all products, these numbers
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are larger than the Pigovian price used in the experiment (GBP19/tCO2, see DEFRA, 2002) and
most other estimates of the social cost of carbon.
Reported in Panel B, the EPM associated with the behavioral effect of Pigovian regulation is
negative, reflecting the fact that for all products the Pigovian subsidy treatment is less effective
than a neutrally framed price change (see equation 11). When measured per tCO2, this measure
of the behavioral bias also has interesting implications for the setting of the Pigovian tax rate,
as it measures the change in relative prices that would be required to compensate the negative
behavioral effects associated with Pigovian regulation. We find that the Pigovian tax rate should
be increased by around GBP48/tCO2 and GBP37.5/tCO2 for for cola and milk products respec-
tively, while our results indicate no statistically significant behavioral bias for spread and meat
products.
Therefore, an important conclusion from the exercise is that the negative behavioral impacts
are related to the effort of behaving prosocially, here switch to one of the less preferred cleaner
alternatives, as measured by the substitutability between clean and dirty alternatives. More
specifically, the EPM capturing the behavioral effects of Pigovian regulation is significantly larger
when consumers perceive clean alternatives to be close substitutes to the dirty ones, and for
these products (cola and milk here) adjustments to the Pigovian tax rate are substantial. For the
other products we consider, meat and spread, substitutability is measured to be lower, and in
turn our EPM estimates are much smaller and not statistically different from zero.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Market-based instruments, and in particular Pigovian regulation, have the potential to make
consumers internalize external effects associated with their choices. However, in the presence
of behavioral agents, framing a change in relative prices as an explicit intervention to encourage
or reward the provision of a global public good may backfire. This could notably be due to
the fact that intrinsic motivation to behave prosocially can decline in response to an external
intervention to promote effort in this direction Gneezy et al. (2011). From this perspective,
regulatory interventions ought to be adjusted to account for these behavioral traits (Allcott
et al., 2014; Farhi and Gabaix, 2015).
In this paper we have used data on consumption behavior in a controlled supermarket shop-
ping environment to shed light on the magnitude and policy relevance of these behavioral ef-
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fects. In our experiment, we found that consumers responded to information by exerting an
effort in the form of a substitution from a dirty product alternative to cleaner one. Estimates
from our structural model indicate that the implied value of carbon emissions, as revealed by
choices once information about emission was revealed, was significantly above most estimates
of Pigovian tax rates. Moreover, experimental results revealed that a monetary incentive ex-
plicitly motivated by the internalization of carbon emissions was less effective as compared to
a neutrally framed change in relative prices of the same magnitude. An implication is that the
price signal of Pigovian regulation would need to be set above its socially efficient level (i.e. the
marginal damages) in order to compensate the negative behavioral effect associated with the
external regulatory intervention.
While, to the best of our knowledge, this paper constitutes the first attempt to draw pol-
icy design implications based on the behavioral effect of Pigovian regulation, our results are
inevitably incomplete and open the door to further research on a number of fronts. First, we
find evidence that the negative behavioral effect of Pigovian regulation is significantly larger for
products with close substitutes available, which suggests that environmental taxes ought to be
set higher for products with price elastic demand. While this finding can be related to varia-
tions in self-image benefits of prosocial behavior (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006), additional
work on the role of effort in relation to financial incentives is warranted. Second, our investiga-
tion has focused on a point-estimate of the EPM, referring to a single estimate of the Pigovian
price signal (or social cost of carbon). In principle, however, our design could be extended to
evaluate the behavioral impact of environmental taxes along the entire demand curve. In fact,
evidence reported in Allcott and Taubinsky (2015) suggests that the EPM can vary at different
relative prices, so that a broader examination of the behavioral effect of environmental taxes
is potentially important. Third, in our experiment we consider a subsidy to the clean alterna-
tives. Further research should consider the behavioral effects associated with a Pigovian tax
instead. Fourth, in actual applications of externality-correcting price signals, behavioral effects
associated with Pigovian regulation may be a function of salience. In cases where salience of
the policy intervention declines with time, the behavioral effects we measure could potentially
be attenuated. On the other hand, empirical evidence reported in Rivers and Schaufele (2015)
suggests that consumers’ response to environmental taxes differ from market-induced price vari-
ations. Further research could therefore investigate, over time, how salience and the behavioral
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effects we measure interact.
Finally, in light of consumers’ implicit valuation of carbon emissions, which is significantly
larger than a Pigovian subsidy level, increasing the Pigovian subsidy rate may reduce the behav-
ioral effects by providing information that is in line with consumer’s prior valuation (Gneezy and
Rustichini, 2000b). Indeed it may be that consumers inferred from the relatively low Pigovian
price signal that climate change is not as problematic as they thought it might be. However, if
negative behavioral effects are driven by moral licensing, so that paying for emissions relieves
the moral cost of socially harmful behavior, it is conceivable that increasing the Pigovian price
signal would further erode the effectiveness of regulation, as it also increases the ability to al-
leviate guilt. Discriminating among these two sources of behavioral bias thus appears to be an
important research avenue.
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Appendix A Sample composition
Table A1: Demographic variables by product category
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cola subsample (N=148)
Male indicator 0.43 0.49 0 1
Age (in years) 34.8 11.87 21 72
Educationa 1.80 0.81 1 3
Incomeb 3.86 2.70 1 9
Children in the householdc 0.69 1.09 0 6
Non-white indicator 0.44 0.50 0 1
Milk subsample (N=372)
Male indicator 0.35 0.48 0 1
Age (in years) 37.51 11.98 18 80
Educationa 1.79 0.74 1 3
Incomeb 4.01 2.73 1 9
Children in the householdc 0.63 0.98 0 6
Non-white indicator 0.33 0.47 0 1
Spread subsample (N=182)
Male indicator 0.29 0.46 0 1
Age (in years) 38.55 12.06 21 79
Educationa 1.81 0.76 1 3
Incomeb 3.63 2.50 1 9
Children in the householdc 0.65 1.01 0 6
Non-white indicator 0.38 0.49 0 1
Meat subsample (N=152)
Male indicator 0.35 0.48 0 1
Age (in years) 38.20 12.14 21 79
Educationa 1.75 0.71 1 3
Incomeb 4.26 2.83 1 9
Children in the householdc 0.62 1.09 0 6
Non-white indicator 0.28 0.45 0 1
Notes: aEducation is coded as: 1 − Non-university education or equivalent; 2 − University education (includes
current undergraduate students); and 3 − Postgraduate level (includes current postgraduate students). bIn GBP
thousand per year. c Number of children in the household.
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Appendix B Treatment randomization
Table B1: Differences in means across treatments
Information Pigovian Price Product
label subsidy change removal
Mean Mean Diff. Mean Diff. Mean Diff.
Male 0.35 0.40 -0.05 0.30 0.05 0.42 -0.07*
indicator (0.48) (0.49) (0.04) (0.46) (0.04) (0.49) (0.04)
Age (in 36.92 37.54 -0.62 37.21 -0.30 35.72 1.20
years) (11.97) (12.42) (1.10) (12.17) (1.08) (12.40) (1.08)
Educationa 1.78 1.79 -0.01 1.83 -0.05 1.75 0.03
(0.75) (0.74) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.73) (0.07)
Incomeb 30.61 32.05 -1.45 32.45 -1.84 29.54 1.07
(20.77) (20.81) (2.04) (20.53) (2.03) (19.92) (1.96)
Children in 0.58 0.57 0.01 0.56 0.02 0.65 -0.07
householdc (1.01) (0.96) (0.09) (0.91) (0.09) (0.97) (0.09)
Non-white 0.39 0.37 0.02 0.34 0.04 0.38 0.001
indicator (0.49) (0.48) (0.04) (0.48) (0.04) (0.49) (0.04)
Notes: Means are reported by sub-samples with standard deviations in parenthesis below. The column with ‘differ-
ences’ reports differences in means between the respective sub-samples and the information label treatment, with
t-statistics reported in parenthesis below. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: statistically significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
aEducation is coded as: 1 − Non-university education or equivalent; 2 − University education (includes current
undergraduate students); and 3 − Postgraduate level (includes current postgraduate students). bIn GBP thousand
per year. c Number of children in the household.
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